Having just had such a scintillating discussion of the moral value of poverty, I thought it might be interesting to consider what position a Catholic ought to take on slavery. I expect our readers may be somewhat divided on the relevant moral questions, so I might as well put my cards on the table from the beginning. First of all, I think it’s perfectly clear that slavery as it existed in the American South before the Civil War is morally indefensible. But secondly, I think that slavery probably can be defended under some circumstances.

The Importance of Moral Autonomy

It is interesting to note that, in the present day, slavery is more strongly and universally condemned in the West than almost any other possible moral evil I could name. There are some obvious historical reasons for this, but we might in any case expect that slavery would be deeply repugnant to a liberal society, in which individual autonomy is arguably the thing most highly prized. Slavery involves the curtailing of the personal freedoms of a certain class of people, and to make matters worse, the master can generally be assumed to be acting in his own interest, and considering the slave’s interest to a lesser degree if at all. If, as Westerners tend to believe, it is of utmost moral importance that an individual should have the freedom to build his life in the way that he chooses, then slavery will be a great evil indeed.

The Catholic position on slavery will be less obvious, because the Catholic commitment to autonomy is less stark. Certainly, some degree of moral autonomy is necessary for every person, if we believe that salvation comes through freely conforming our wills to God’s. A person need not have an unlimited number of options open to him in order to exercise individual autonomy, but presumably he needs some. So, for example, from the very early years of the Church it has been widely believed that every Catholic should be permitted to choose his state in life. St. Paul seems to counsel this. Another example would be the Church’s position on arranged marriages. I don’t know if the early Church Fathers addressed that one explicitly, and St. Paul did not, but the Catholic moralists of the 19th and 20th centuries seem to have frowned on arranged marriages. The Baltimore Catechism advises children to listen gravely to parental advice on this important question, but goes on to specify that they should not be forced to act against their own wishes. And certainly, the Church has never permitted priests or anyone else to force baptism, or any sacrament, on adults who were unwilling to receive it. These all seem to point to the Church’s acknowledgement that individual autonomy does have some importance. We can’t come to God freely unless we are, in a significant sense, free.

So autonomy is not worthless, but on the other hand, Catholics certainly should not follow liberals in their obsession with maximizing it in every possible way. Instead, the Church teaches that we are rightly subject to authorities of many kinds, and that we can be blessed for submitting willingly to those that are properly instituted. Rightly understood, this does not require us to relinquish moral autonomy. In one sense, moral autonomy is being manifested most fully when a person opts to bind himself to another person, or to God, through an act of will. Quite aside from the pragmatic necessities, submission to authority holds a particular value for Christians, since it can train us in humility, reminding us that our own wishes or judgments should often be set aside. Submitting to human authority can put us in the right state for submitting to God’s authority.

The bottom line is that, while moral autonomy is certainly important, we don’t necessarily need a maximal, comprehensive freedom in order to exercise it; indeed, that probably would not be optimal. Insofar as a person is deprived of, for example, freedom of movement, or the opportunity to select his own clothing or daily tasks, this would not necessarily prevent him from exercising moral autonomy in those ways that are most relevant to God and salvation.

The application to slavery is obvious. Slaves are deprived of certain freedoms, but their wills are still free, and they can still make moral choices. The orders imposed on them by other authorities may hinder them in their development of mature autonomy, but it may also help them to learn humility through their submission. This would not necessarily be an indignity, any more than a priest is undignified in submitting to the command of his bishop, or for that matter, any more than the Supreme Pontiff is undignified in submitting to the will of God. This understanding seems to be supported by Scripture. St. Paul tells slaves to submit to their masters, even in the event that they are unjust. Nowhere does he condemn the institution of slavery, though it certainly did exist in his world. So it seems that the Apostle to the Gentiles at least did not think slavery clearly, heinously evil.

Chattel Slavery and the South

A lot of objections can be anticipated at this point. Submitting to authority may not per se be an indignity or a curtailment of any of the liberties that we need for salvation. But it certainly seems possible for slaves to be treated in an undignified way, or to be ordered by their masters to do evil things. Here we confront the phenomenon of chattel slavery – a state in which slaves can be considered the property of their masters absolutely. With this kind of slavery, masters are free to treat slaves in any way at all without fearing legal repercussions.

As Catholics, it isn’t clear that we can ever own anything in this sense – that is to say, in such a way that there are no moral restrictions on what we can do with it. Everything we own should in a sense be considered “on loan” from God, and we should use all things in a way that’s consistent with their, and our, natures. This is most obviously true with respect to people. Every human being is a creature with a rational nature and a soul that is precious to God. So treating slaves in a way that is not consistent with that nature is clearly sinful.

This is why I say that slavery in the American South was clearly unjustified. Masters were free to prevent slaves from discharging their religious duties, to take sexual liberties with them, to sell them away from their spouses or children, and many other things that were obviously inimical to the slaves’ physical and spiritual well-being. I can see no way at all for this sort of arrangement to be condoned by a Catholic in good faith. If slave owners are to be given the status of authority figures, they must, like all properly instituted authority figures, take concern for the well-being of those under their care (even, probably, to the detriment of their own interests.) There may have been individual slave owners in the South who did understand the relationship that way, and who placed the highest priority on the well-being of their slaves, but the legal and social climate does not seem to have fostered this to a very great extent. The American practice of slavery thus stands condemned.

Other Avenues for Exploration

In the Ancient world, as I understand it, slavery sometimes took less absolute forms. So, for example, we can imagine a form of slavery in which slaves, while generally obliged to follow their masters’ orders and to work for them, were given legal protection from particular sorts of treatment. Slave owners, meanwhile, would be required to provide a reasonable standard of living for their slaves, and would be generally expected to take an active interest in their slaves’ physical and spiritual welfare.

Taken in this sense, I think it’s hard to deny that slavery would be an actual good for some people. Aristotle certainly believed this, and his words on the subject have been the target of scathing criticism in the modern era. No doubt he loses credibility for his claim that all non-Greeks would be better off as slaves. Still, his claim that some people might be “natural slaves” is not entirely ridiculous. There are individuals who seem not to have the ability to care for themselves. Even in adulthood, some people find themselves constantly getting into trouble, hurting others, and generally making choices that are certain to make their own lives (to say nothing of others’) miserable. These people might genuinely be better off with a life in which their freedom to hurt themselves were more severely restricted. If there are any natural slaves, and any potential masters who would be able and willing to take charge of them, then the institution of slavery could be, not just justified, but a positive good.

I’ve been reflecting of late on further related questions, the most important being: under what circumstances could one person justifiably claim this kind of authority over another? Presumably we can all agree that it is greviously unjust for a man to be kidnapped, dragged away from his homeland and family, and forcibly thrust under the authority of another person who assumes the charge purely for the sake of financial gain. Other cases, though, are less clear. Should a person be allowed to sell or give himself into slavery? Could he be born a slave? Might prisoners of war be justly retained as slaves? I’m not going to answer these questions today, in the interests of keeping this already-quite-long post to a more readable length. If people are sufficiently interested, I might take the topic up again at a later time. But for now, I think it’s enough to conclude that slavery in the South was wrong, but that the moral situation of slavery generally is more complex than the modern knee-jerk reaction to it would lead us to believe.