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An email discussion of the newest serial-killer flick to hit the theatres got me thinking again about the topic of mental illness. It’s really just the most morbidly fascinating tip of an iceberg of questions about how to reconcile psychology with a moral philosophy that holds human beings responsible for at least some of what they do. But, since it is the most morbidly fascinating bit, I’ll go ahead and say something about it.
As a purely empirical matter, there can’t be much wrong with observing troubled human beings and making probabilistic connections between their different behaviors. Things become tricky, though, when we start putting certain types of behavior under the heading “disease.” We normally think of a disease as something a person can’t help having, for which they should not be blamed. Insofar as mental illnesses distort a person’s perception of physical realities (i.e. making it difficult for them to determine who or where they are, or to distinguish actual physical events from fabricated ones) we are generally quite willing to classify them as diseases and to take compassion on sufferers. Then there is a middle ground composed of illnesses like depression, alcoholism, attention-deficit disorder, and others, which don’t radically distort the patient’s perception of reality, but which do make it more difficult for them to behave in normal or appropriate ways. There are many difficult questions here about moral responsibility, but most of us are probably inclined to think of these illnesses as a sort of stumbling block — they don’t absolve patients of all responsibility for misdeeds, but they might be a mitigating factor at times. And most of us are probably pretty ready to regard sufferers of these conditions with compassion.
The hardest pill to swallow, though, is the so called “personality disorder.” These are also classified as mental illnesses, but most of the symptoms seem to be things that would in another context be classified simply as “deeply sinful actions.”
Take, for example, Antisocial Personality Disorder, a mental illness that was added to the psychology books in the relatively recent past. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders diagnoses a person as suffering from this disease when he exhibits three or more of the following symptoms:
1. failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
2. deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
3. impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
4. irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated fights or assaults (both physically or mentally)
5. reckless disregard for safety of self or others
6. consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain steady work or honor financial obligations
7. lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
Well, where I come from, we’ve known about this disease for a very long time, but we have a different name for it: being a bad person. People in every time have given way to selfishness, greed, and hatred, sometimes to horrifying degrees, but there’s something very bizarre and disturbing about labelling such people as “ill” in the same way that a person with Alzheimer’s would be called ill. It seems to indicate, as I mentioned above, that the person may not be responsible for their actions… just as the Alzheimer’s patient doesn’t really seem responsible for his inability to remember certain things, even if that weakness leads to otherwise reprehensible behavior (i.e. forgetting a promise, forgetting to go to Mass, or forgetting an important birthday or anniversary.)
So, there are dangers that the label “personality disorder” might lead us to excuse too much. The truth is, though, that this doesn’t seem to be happening on the level of criminal justice. Although psychopathy, for example, is classified as a mental illness, it isn’t one that defense lawyers like to throw around for the benefit of their clients. In general a person diagnosed as a psychopath is more likely, not less, to be convicted and to be given a harsh sentence (such as a life in prison or the death penalty.) This is understandable, since the psychopath is known for being merciless and remorseless, and particularly impervious to reform. He is also known for using his high intelligence to charm and manipulate others, and to hide his evil intentions, thus enabling him to successfully pursue his malevolent ends on all levels of society. It’s hardly surprising that judges and juries want to be sure such people are safely put away (or executed). However, in a Christian context, this is troubling. Can an “illness” put an individual beyond reform? Surely steps can be taken to save even the truly wicked?
What ought to be done with people diagnosed with such disorders? Sometimes, of course, parents or teachers may see signs of the incipient condition before the patient has actually done anything truly heinous. In childhood, developing ASPD or psychopathy can be anticipated in children who enjoy torturing animals and in pyromaniacs (some also list late bedwetting as a warning sign, though it probably isn’t too worrisome unless seen in conjunction with these other traits.) Should a young person exhibiting such signs be put under psychiatric care? Sent to a convent or a reform school? Exorcised? Some combination of these?
And for those diagnosed in adulthood, perhaps after committing certain horrible acts, what should our attitude be? This could be a real problem for, for example, a prison chaplain trying to decide how to approach inmates on death row. He will have to consider soberly the degree to which a troubled person is responsible for his actions, as well as the degree to which reform is a realistic possibility. Even for those of us who don’t (we hope) encounter psychopaths or sociopaths regularly, it’s a challenge figuring out how to think about them. On one level, it doesn’t seem wholly wrong to pity them, thinking a grateful “there but for the grace of God…” As Augustine reminds us in his famous fruit-stealing episode of the Confessions, the seeds of radical evil are planted in all of us, and we can never know how far we might have fallen but for God’s undeserved grace.
At the same time, though, too much identification with a really deeply wicked person seems frightening and maybe wrong. I have a lot of personal experience with greed and selfishness, but I don’t know that Ted Bundy and I were that much alike; I, for example, generally feel pain instead of pleasure when I realize that I’ve hurt someone. Using such people as a cautionary tale also seems like a stretch. I am tempted to many unfortunate thoughts and actions, but I’m not much inclined towards senseless violence or sadism. We shouldn’t underestimate radical depravity by identifying it too flippantly with our own more petty weaknesses.
How have the great saints responded to the fantastically and grotesquely evil man? I can think of lots of examples of encounters between saints and heretics, but nothing quite like this.
St. Louis-Marie de Montfort,
Pope St. Pius X,
St. Joseph,
St. Ambrose of Milan,
St. Thomas Aquinas,
St. Francis (and St. Clare),
St. Catherine of Siena,
St. Alphonsus Ligouri,
St. John Chrysostom,
“How have the great saints responded to the fantastically and grotesquely evil man? I can think of lots of examples of encounters between saints and heretics, but nothing quite like this.”
How about St. Leo the Great and Attila the Hun? Apparently heavenly signs were necessary to hold Attila back.
Doesn’t Aristotle say that there are people who are bad because they defy their conscience, and there are others who are bad because their conscience has been corrupted and tells them to do bad things? In other words, they’re so far gone that an appeal to good will is useless — they’ve destroyed that faculty.
St. Alphonsus de Liguori preached alot about the abuse of divine grace. He seemed to hold that there was a certain amount of sins that one could do — a different, unknown number for each person — after which God “hardened” that person’s heart. This could not justify despair, since no can know when this tipping-point has been reached, and as long as God provides the grace of hope one is justified in continuing to exercise it (i.e. that hope itself shows that God has not rejected that person entirely). But some people — we don’t know who, but it could be ourselves some day — really have passed the limit and will do nothing with the rest of their lives but increase the divine wrath that awaits them in the next life (well, for them, the next death).
Yes, that’s very interesting, Tobias Petrus. I hadn’t thought of applying that saying of St’ Alphonsus’ to this case. As you say, he taught that God will pull us out of mortal sin a certain number of times, and no more… and if that’s so, perhaps there are some among us who have already exhausted their number and are more like the living damned. In the same way that the souls of some saints seemed to have a foot in heaven even within their lifetimes, these moral monsters might already have one foot in hell, with only the formality of death separating them.
It is troubling, though, that we can sometimes see these personalities developing from childhood or early adolescence? It is possible, I suppose, that the occasional odd person may surrender his soul to evil even from quite a young age. It’s rather horrible to think, though, that some souls might be lost even before they reach adulthood, while the people themselves go on living as tools of Satan for years afterwards.
I have only once personally known someone who seemed to me to have serious sociopathic tendencies, but that young man was only fifteen years old. As it happens, he was a member of one of the Uzbek families that I lived with for a short period during my Peace Corps service (and it was primiarly on his account that my residence with them was so short.) I’ve been around a great number of fifteen-year-old boys, so I know perfectly well that it can be a trying and difficult age, and I’m generally pretty tolerant. This boy, though, was very strikingly distinctive. There was not a hint of insecurity to his cruel and destructive acts, nor was there any sign of remorse afterwards. His mother and sisters were clearly quite afraid of him (and his father, the one person for whom he had any respect at all, was rarely around since it was a polygamous family and he divided his attention between wives.) I remember, being in extended contact with this boy did remind me of Aristotle’s words about corrupted conscience, and how for some it can simply be destroyed beyond repair. But, I used to wonder, is it really possible to do it so young? I don’t have eyes into the soul, so there’s no way to be sure, I suppose…
Pope John Paul II made significant errors within his Evangelium Vitae, with regard to the death penalty and, as a result, those teachings should not have been enterred into the Catechism. Please review.
Pope John Paul II: a pro-death penalty essay
by Dudley Sharp, Justice Matters
(contact info, below)
October 1997, with subsequent updates thru 8/06
SEE ADDITIONAL REFERENCES AT THE END OF THIS DOCUMENT
In 1997, the Roman Catholic Church decided to amend the 1992 Universal Catechism to reflect Pope John Paul II’s comments within his 1995 encyclical, The Gospel of Life (Evangelium Vitae). Therein, the Pope finds that the only time executions can be justified is when they are required “to defend society” and that “as a result of steady improvements . . . in the penal system that such cases are very rare if not practically non existent.”
This is, simply, not true. Murderers, tragically, harm and murder, again, way too often.
Three issues, inexplicably, escaped the Pope’s consideration.
First, in the Pope’s context, “to defend society” means that the execution of the murderer must save future lives or, otherwise, prevent future harm.
When looking at the history of criminal justice practices in probations, paroles and incarcerations, we observe countless examples of when judgements and procedures failed and, because of that, murderers harmed and/or murdered, again. History details that murderers murder and otherwise harm again, time and time again — in prison, after escape, after improper release, and, of course, after we fail to capture or incarcerate them.
Reason dictates that living murderers are infinitely more likely to harm and/or murder again than are executed murderers.
Therefore, the Pope could err, by calling for a reduction or end to execution, and thus sacrifice more innocents, or he could “err” on the side of protecting more innocents by calling for an expansion of executions.
History, reason and the facts support an increase in executions based upon a defending society foundation.
Secondly, if social science concludes that executions provide enhanced deterrence for murders, then the Pope’s position should call for increased executions.
If we decide that the deterrent effect of executions does not exist and we, therefore, choose not to execute, and we are wrong, this will sacrifice innocent lives and also give those murderers the opportunity to harm and murder again.
If we choose to execute, believing in the deterrent effect, and we are wrong, we are executing our worst human rights violators and preventing such murderers from ever harming or murdering again - again, saving more innocent lives.
No responsible social scientist has or will say that the death penalty deters no one. Quite a few studies, including 8 recent ones, find that executions do deter.
As all prospects for negative consequence deter some, it is a mystery why the Pope chose the option which spares murderers and sacrifices more innocent lives.
If the Pope’s defending society position has merit, then the Church must actively support executions, as it offers an enhanced defense of society and greater protection for innocent life.
Thirdly, we know that some criminals don’t murder because of their fear of execution. This is known as the individual deterrent effect. Unquestionably, the incapacitation effect (execution) and the individual deterrent effect both exist and they both defend society by protecting innocent life and offer enhanced protections over imprisonment. Furthermore, individual deterrence assures us that general deterrence must exist, because individual deterrence could not exist without it. Executions save lives.
Therefore, the Pope’s defending society standard should be a call for increasing executions. Instead, the Pope and other Church leadership has chosen a position that spares the lives of known murderers, resulting in more innocents put at risk and more innocents harmed and murdered – a position which, quite clearly, contradicts the Pope’s, and other’s, emphasis on defending society.
Contrary to the Church’s belief, that the Pope’s opinion represents a tougher stance against the death penalty, the opposite is true. When properly evaluated, the defending society position supports more executions.
Had these issues been properly assessed, the Catechism would never have been amended – unless the Church endorses a position knowing that it would spare the lives of guilty murderers, at the cost of sacrificing more innocent victims.
When the choice is 1) sparing murderers, resulting in more harmed and murdered innocents, who suffer through endless moments of incredible horror, with no additional time to prepare for their salvation, or 2) executing murderers, who have on average, an additional 10 years on death row to prepare for their salvation, and saving more innocents from being murdered, the Pope and the Catholic Church have an obligation to spare the innocent, as Church tradition, the Doctors of the Church and many Saints have concluded. (see reference, below)
Pope John Paul II’s death penalty stance is his own, personal prudential judgement and does not bind any other Catholic to share his position. Any Catholic can choose to support more executions, based upon their own prudential judgement, and remain a Catholic in good standing.
Furthermore, prudential judgement requires a foundation of reasoned and thorough review. The Pope either improperly evaluated the risk to innocents or he did not evaluate it at all.
A defending society position supports more executions, not less. Therefore, his prudential judgement was in error on this important point of fact.
Furthermore, defending society is an outcome of the death penalty, but is secondary to the foundation of justice and biblical instruction.
Even though Romans and additional writings do reveal a “defending society” consideration, such references pale in comparison to the mandate that execution is the proper punishment for murder, regardless of any consideration “to defend society.” Both the Noahic covenant, in Genesis 9:6 (”Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.”), and the Mosaic covenant, throughout the Pentateuch (Ex.: “He that smiteth a man so that he may die, shall be surely put to death.” Exodus 21:12), provide execution as the punishment for unjustifiable/intentional homicide, otherwise known as murder.
These texts, and others, offer specific rebuttal to the Pope’s position that if “bloodless means” for punishment are available then such should be used, to the exclusion of execution. The Pope’s prudential judgement does not trump biblical instruction.
Most telling is the fact that Roman Catholic tradition instructs four elements to be considered with criminal sanction.
1. Defense of society against the criminal.
2. Rehabilitation of the criminal (including spiritual rehabilitation).
3. Retribution, which is the reparation of the disorder caused by the criminal’s transgression.
4. Deterrence
It is a mystery why and how the Pope could have excluded three of these important elements. In doing so, though, we can confirm that his review was very incomplete and, thus, improper.
At least two Saints, Paul and Dismas, faced execution and stated that it was appropriate. They were both executed.
The Holy Ghost decided that execution was the proper punishment for two devoted, early Christians, Ananias and his wife, Saphira, for the crime/sin of lying. Neither was given a moment to consider their earthly punishment or to ask for forgiveness. The Holy Ghost struck them dead.
For those who erroneously contend that Jesus abandoned the Law of the Hebrew Testament, He states that He has come not “to abolish the law and the prophets . . . but to fulfill them.” Matthew 5:17-22. While there is honest debate regarding the interpretation of Mosaic Law within a Christian context, there seems little dispute that the Noahic Covenant is still in effect and that Genesis 9:6 deals directly with the sanctity of life issue in its support of execution. (read “A Seamless Garment In a Sinful World” by John R. Connery, S. J., America, 7/14/84, p 5-8).
“In his debates with the Pharisees, Jesus cites with approval the apparently harsh commandment, He who speaks evil of father or mother, let him surely die (Mt 15:4; Mk 7:10, referring to Ex 21:17; cf. Lev 20:9). (Cardinal Avery Dulles, SJ, 10/7/2000)
Saint Pius V reaffirms this mandate, in the Roman Catechism of the Council of Trent (1566), stating that executions are acts of “paramount obedience to this [Fifth] Commandment.” (”Thou shalt not murder,” sometimes improperly translated as “kill” instead of “murder”). And, not only do the teachings of Saints Thomas Aquinas and Augustine concur, but both saints also find that such punishment actually reflects charity and mercy by preventing the wrongdoer from sinning further. The Saints position is that execution offers undeniable defense of society as well as defense of the wrongdoer.
Such prevention also expresses the fact that execution is an enhanced defense of society, over and above all other punishments.
The relevant question is “What biblical and theological teachings, developed from 1566 through 1997, provide that the standard for executions should evolve from ‘paramount obedience’ to God’s eternal law to a civil standard reflecting ’steady improvements’ . . . in the penal system?”. Such teachings hadn’t changed. The Pope’s position is social, not biblical nor theological.
If Saint Pius V was correct, that executions represent “paramount obedience to the [Fifth] Commandments, then is it not disobedient to reduce or stop executions?
The Church’s position on the use of the death penalty has been consistent from 300 AD through 1995 AD. The Church has always supported the use of executions, based upon biblical and theological principles.
Until 1995, says John Grabowski, associate professor of Moral Theology at Catholic University, ” . . . Church teachings were supportive of the death penalty. You can find example after example of Pope’s, of theologians and others, who have supported the right of the state to inflict capital punishment for certain crimes and certain cases.” Grabowski continues: “What he (the Pope now) says, in fact, in his encyclical, is that given the fact that we now have the ability, you know, technology and facilities to lock up someone up for the rest of their lives so they pose no future threat to society — given that question has been answered or removed, there is no longer justification for the death penalty.” (All Things Considered, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, 9/9/97.)
The Pope’s position is now based upon the state of the corrections system — a position neither biblical nor theological in nature. Furthermore, it is a position which conflicts with the history of prisons. Long term incarceration of lawbreakers in Europe began in the 1500s. Of course, long term incarceration of slaves had begun thousands of years before – meaning that all were aware that criminal wrongdoers could also be subject to bondage, if necessary - something that all historians and biblical scholars — now and then and in between – were and are well aware of.
Since it’s inception, the Church has issued numerous pronouncements, encyclicals and previous Universal Catechisms. Had any biblical or theological principle called for a replacement of the death penalty by life imprisonment, it could have been revealed long before 1995.
There is, finally, a disturbing reality regarding the Pope’s new standard. The Pope’s defending society standard requires that the moral concept of justice becomes irrelevant. The Pope’s standard finds that capital punishment can be used only as a vehicle to prevent future crimes. Therefore, using the Pope’s standard, the moral/biblical rational — that capital punishment is the just or required punishment for murder — is no longer relevant to the sin/crime of murder.
If defending society is the new standard, the Pope has decided that the biblical standards of atonement, expiation, justice and required punishments have all, necessarily, been discarded, with regard to execution.
The Pope’s new position establishes that capital punishment no longer has any connection to the harm done or to the imbalance to be addressed. Yet, such connection had always been, until now, the Church’s historical, biblically based perspective on this sanction. Under a defending society standard, the injury suffered by the murder victim is no longer relevant to their punishment. Executions can be justified solely upon that punishments ability to prevent future harm by the murderer.
Therefore, when considering executions in regard to capital murder cases, a defending society standard renders justice irrelevant. Yet, execution defends society to a degree unapproachable by any other punishment and, therefore, should have been fully supported by the Pope.
“Some enlightened people would like to banish all conception of retribution or desert from our theory of punishment and place its value wholly in the deterrence of others or the reform of the criminal himself. They do not see that by doing so they render all punishment unjust. What can be more immoral than to inflict suffering on me for the sake of deterring others if I do not deserve it?” (quote attributed to the distinguished Christian writer C. S. Lewis)
Again, with regard to the Pope’s prudential judgement, his neglect of justice was most imprudent.
Some Catholic scholars, properly, have questioned the appropriateness of including prudential judgement within a Catechism. Personal opinion does not belong within a Catechism and, likely, will never be allowed, again. I do not believe it had ever been allowed before.
In fact, neither the Church nor the Pope would accept a defending society standard for use of the death penalty, unless the Church and the Pope believed that such punishment was just and deserved, as well. The Church has never questioned the authority of the government to execute in “cases of extreme gravity,” nor does it do so with these recent changes.
Certainly, the Church and the Pope John Paul II believe that the prevention of any and all violent crimes fulfills a defending society position. And there is no doubt that executions defend society at a level higher than incarceration. Why has the Pope and many within Church leadership chosen a path that spares murderers at the cost of sacrificing more innocent lives, when they could have chosen a stronger defense of society which spares more innocents?
Properly, the Pope did not challenge the Catholic biblical and theological support for capital punishment. The Pope has voiced his own, personal belief as to the appropriate application of that penalty.
So why has the Pope come out against executions, when his own position — a defense of society — which, both rationally and factually, has a foundation supportive of more executions?
It is unfortunate that the Pope, along with some other leaders in the Church, have decided to, improperly, use a defending society position to speak against the death penalty.
The Pope’s position against the death penalty condemns more innocents and neglects justice.
——————————————-
Please also refer to:
(1) “Catholic and other Christian References: Support for the Death Penalty”, at
homicidesurvivors(DOT)com/2006/10/12/catholic-and-other-christian-references-support-for-the-death-penalty.aspx
(2) ”Capital Punishment: A Catholic Perspective” at
www(DOT)sspx.org/against_the_sound_bites/capital_punishment.htm
(3) “The Purpose of Punishment (in the Catholic tradition)”, by R. Michael Dunningan, J.D., J.C.L., CHRISTIFIDELIS, Vol.21,No.4, sept 14, 2003
www(dot)st-joseph-foundation.org/newsletter/lead.php?document=2003/21-4
(4) “MOST CATHOLICS OPPOSE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?”, KARL KEATING’S E-LETTER, Catholic Answers, March 2, 2004
www(dot)catholic.com/newsletters/kke_040302.asp
(5) “THOUGHTS ON THE BISHOPS’ MEETING: NOWADAYS, VOTERS IGNORE BISHOPS” , KARL KEATING’S E-LETTER, Catholic Answers,, Nov. 22, 2005
www(dot)catholic.com/newsletters/kke_051122.asp
copyright 1997-2007 Dudley Sharp
Dudley Sharp, Justice Matters
e-mail sharp(at)aol.com, 713-622-5491,
Houston, Texas
Mr. Sharp has appeared on ABC, BBC, CBS, CNN, C-SPAN, FOX, NBC, NPR, PBS and many other TV and radio networks, on such programs as Nightline, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, The O’Reilly Factor, etc., has been quoted in newspapers throughout the world and is a published author.
A former opponent of capital punishment, he has written and granted interviews about, testified on and debated the subject of the death penalty, extensively and internationally.
Pro death penalty sites
www(dot)cjlf.org/deathpenalty/DPinformation.htm
www(dot)clarkprosecutor.org/html/links/dplinks.htm
www(dot)dpinfo.com
joshmarquis(dot)blogspot.com/
www(dot)lexingtonprosecutor.com/death_penalty_debate.htm
www(dot)prodeathpenalty.com
www(dot)prodeathpenalty.org/
www(dot)yesdeathpenalty.com/deathpenalty_contents.htm (Sweden)
www(dot)wesleylowe.com/cp.html
Dudley, thanks for the death penalty post. I agree with your position — Pope John Paul the Fair was wrong on this matter. In fact, I think that his error also points out an error in the thinking of Hilaire Belloc. Belloc wrote, “Europe is the Faith, the Faith is Europe,” or at least words to that effect are attributed to him. For a long time now I have found this preposterous. Opposition to the death penalty is a *very* European phenomenon, as is the Enlightenment which produced it. And the Pope was being quite a good European in judging that mankind had developed beyond the stage when the death penalty was good. Yet that very European position is not compatible with a sensible application of the Faith to real-life scenarios. Belloc too closely identified a mutable, natural civilization (or group of civilizations) with a supernatural, supranational system (Catholicism). So too did the quite Western-thinking (to their detriment) experts at Vatican II.
But I digress. To stay on topic, Dudley, what are your thoughts on those with purported “disorders,” though?
Great post. I used to be a therapist, then taught psychology for awhile. Even after allowing that there may be a few folks whose behavior is due to brain injury, cysts, and tumors. Even allowing for Bi-polar disorder, most of what we did was to provide labels to excuse folks for being irresponsible. I worked with scores of kids labeled ADD. All but a couple weren’t anything other than BRATS.
My experience was that concupiscence explained most I worked with. They just did what they could get away with. If they got in trouble, they wanted to blame their dysfunctional family. Most, if not all, of the depressed got depressed for the same two reasons I get depressed: 1)feel sorry for myself when I don’t get my way 2)take my focus off God and put it on me.
Some people need info on learning to better manage their anxiety. But most don’t want to work that hard, so there’s a lot of drugs prescribed to push them out of the office.
There might be some sort of demonic something with the really rare, but even Bundy got away with stuff and he had a poorly formed conscience.
I never met anyone who wouldn’t solve most of their problems if they’d read their Bible and really live it, go to confession more often, go to mass more often, commit to stop belly-aching, exercise more, and help someone else.
Oh, after I literally stumbled across Thomism, I realized everything I was studying and believing had been countered 800 years ago. Wow
“Momma, don’t let your son grow up to be a therapist.”
Introduction to the Science of Mental Health
Fr. Chad Ripperger, Ph.D., F.S.S.P.
[ ] Vol. 1: Philosophical Psychology
From the foreword by Most Reverend Fabian W. Bruskewitz, Bishop of Lincoln: “While the book is not an exhaustive treatment of the subject of the philosophy of man, it does a good job of tying together various parts of St. Thomas’ thought and shows how necessary it is as a proper foundation for the science of psychology.”
Softcover. 326 pp. $30.00
[ ] Vol. 2: Sacred and Other Spiritual Causes
This text addresses the various aspects of Catholic theology as they affect mental health, including the relationship of psychology to theology, sin as it affects mental health, the infused virtues, sacraments, gifts of the Holy Ghost, prayer and demonic influences.
Softcover. 274 pp. $30.00
Thanks for the recommendation, JSP. I recommend, “Psychology as Religion: the Cult of Self-Worship,” by Paul C. Vitz. It traces the cult of self and self-esteem in the (post)modern world. Interestingly enough, he identifies German Pietist strands of protestantism as one of the roots of this error. Indeed, I’ve read other accounts of the psychotherapeutical ideology (Jung, etc.) that also put the blame on Pietist protestantism. Vitz has a Ph.D. and taught psychiatry (or psychology?) at some big universities. He is a committed Catholic and has written “Faith of the Fatherless” (where he links lack of a good father with atheism later in life, by analyzing the biographies of various atheists) and “Freud’s Christian Unconscious” (where he traces the influence of a Catholic nanny on Freud’s subsequent development).